While the open nature of radio propagation enables convenient "anywhere" wireless access, it becomes the root of security vulnerabilities in wireless communications. In light of this, physical-layer authentication, which is based on exploitation of the dynamics of physical layer attributes, is emerging as an effective approach to enhancing wireless security. In this article, we first review the existing physical-layer authentication techniques and identify their current limitations, ranging from low authentication reliability to the difficulties of integrating these techniques with the existing wireless infrastructure and applying them in complex future networks. We then present three promising research areas in addressing these challenges. Specifically, we propose the use of the multi-attribute multi-observation technique for enhancing the authentication reliability. In order to apply pointto-point physical-layer authentication techniques into existing wireless networks, we propose a cross-layer authentication approach relying on a composite security key that can seamlessly integrate physical-layer and upper-layer authentication schemes. We also discuss possible ways of invoking physical-layer authentication to reduce both the complexity and latency of the security processes in complex heterogeneous networks with the aid of the proposed physical security context sharing.
IntroductIon
Authentication of a wireless device is conventionally handled above the physical layer using keybased cryptography. Although the effectiveness of such techniques has been proven, the security key distribution and management over dynamic wireless networks face a range of emerging problems. The timely sharing of security keys in highly complex networks supporting a large number of mobile and heterogeneous devices is becoming a new challenge. On one hand, the high computational cost of key generation/detection may result in excessive latencies in largescale networks, which may become intolerable for delay-sensitive communications. On the other hand, the promise that the digital key cannot be computationally broken still remains mathematically unproven [1] . With the rapid growth of processing power, the time spent on cracking a digital security key could be remarkably shortened. Most importantly, attackers using unauthorized security keys cannot easily be detected when the physical-layer attributes are disregarded, because user identification and access rights are only validated through digital keys.
In contrast to the existing upper-layer security schemes, wireless transmitters can also be validated at the physical layer by verifying the dynamic characteristics of the associated physical communication links and devices [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , that is, through physical-layer authentication. The reciprocal channel properties and some of the analog front-end (AFE) imperfections of wireless transceivers primarily constitute two categories of physical-layer attributes for device authentication [2] . Compared to digital key-based authentication, the specific physical-layer attributes are directly related to the communicating devices and the corresponding environment, which are extremely difficult to impersonate. Furthermore, both the channel and device imperfection estimation and compensation techniques constitute inherent functions of communications receivers exploited to improve reception performance. As a benefit of this, physical-layer authentication can be accomplished without incurring additional security overhead.
In this article, we first identify the technical challenges of physical-layer authentication in terms of reliability and integration with the existing network infrastructure and protocols. Three promising directions in overcoming these challenges are discussed. Specifically, we propose to enhance the reliability of physical-layer authentication with the aid of a novel multi-attribute multi-observation (MAMO) technique. Furthermore, we explore the inherent link attributes for physical-layer key generation in enabling the concept of the composite security key (CSK). In doing so, physical-layer authentication can be efficiently integrated with existing cryptography-based infrastructures and protocols. Additionally, the authentication procedure of the future fifth generation (5G) heterogeneous networks may be simplified and enhanced by the proposed predicted physical security context sharing (PSCS). 
Physical-Layer Authentication for

chAllenges In physIcAl-lAyer AuthentIcAtIon
Disregarding the extensive research attention it has drawn, physical-layer authentication is still far from practical deployment due to several challenges. In this section, three challenges in physical-layer authentication are discussed in detail.
low relIAbIlIty of physIcAl-lAyer AuthentIcAtIon
In general, physical-layer authentication techniques can be classified as channel-based and AFE-imperfection-based approaches, as shown in Fig. 1 . Channel-based physical-layer authentication exploits the environment-dependent radiometric features of a specific transceiver pair, such as channel state information (CSI) [3] and the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [7] . These channel characteristics can be used to differentiate signals arriving from an authorized transmitter and those from spoofing transmitters. However, extensive channel monitoring and frequent adaptation of the authentication rules are required when the channel is non-stationary. This may become a challenge in highly dynamic environments (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle communications) and sleep-mode-aided networks (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4 networks).
On the other hand, the attributes of the AFE may also be explored for authentication due to its relatively stable nature. These AFE imperfections are inevitable variations introduced to different devices during the fabrication of analog components. Several device-specific characteristics, including the in-phase/quadrature imbalance (IQI) [4] , the digital-to-analog converter and the power amplifier characteristics [5] , as well as the carrier frequency offset (CFO) [6] , have been explored for authentication. In practice, the difference of the selected hardware attributes between different devices is usually small, and its observation is further corrupted by both noise and interference, which reduces the accuracy of estimating these attributes for authentication purposes.
IntegrAtIon wIth the exIstIng network InfrAstructure And AuthentIcAtIon protocols Given the significant advantages of physical-layer authentication, it is straightforward to consider the integrated exploitation of physical-layer authentication as a complement to the upper-layer authentication schemes.
One of the most challenging tasks in cross-layer authentication is the integration of physical-layer authentication with the existing infrastructure and protocols. In [2] , an overview of cross-layer authentication by using lower-/ physical-layer characteristics is provided. Some of the existing cross-layer schemes are implemented through quantization of physical-layer characteristics for upper-layer verification [8] . Although the authentication is realized at an upper layer, the principles of this kind of method and of classic cryptography are rather different. Hence, using it directly in a cryptosystem will impose additional cost, and it is also likely to produce challenges.
Another related challenge is how to extend device-to-device physical-layer authentication to the more general scenarios of end-to-end authentication. In [9] , a physical-layer key generation scheme exploiting the channel reciprocity of the directly connected transmitter and receiver is discussed. However, in large-scale wireless networks, authentication and key exchange usually take place between devices that are not directly linked. In contrast, most current physical-layer authentication procedures are limited to deviceto-device authentication, since they rely on the characteristics gleaned by analyzing the direct communication links between the transmitter and receiver. As a result, it is critical to develop an authentication process that is not restricted to the physical layer of two directly communicating devices.
AuthentIcAtIon In complex heterogeneous networks
It is anticipated that the operational wireless infrastructure will evolve into the 5G by supporting the dramatically increased tele-traffic. Given the significantly increased network complexity, mobile users will have to frequently switch between different base stations or access points, which results in frequent authentication handover. This situation becomes even more challenging in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). The authentication handover is traditionally based on a cryptographic key and on multiple handshakes, as proposed by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in [10] . To seamlessly hand over the entire context, the handover has to involve multiple entities including users, access points (APs), base stations (BSs), and servers. Sophisticated backhaul processing and multiple handshakes have to be involved for information or pairwise key exchanges between these entities. In practice, all of these contribute to unwanted latency. This procedure could take up to hundreds of milliseconds, which is far beyond the latency tolerance of 5G services [11] .
future development of physIcAl-lAyer securIty
In this section, we present three possible solutions to address the identified challenges. relIAbIlIty enhAncement by multI-AttrIbute multI-observAtIon AuthentIcAtIon technIques
As discussed earlier, the performance of physical-layer authentication is often degraded by the instability of the rapidly time-varying channel. Additionally, the performance of AFE-imperfection-based authentication techniques is limited by the low reliability of AFE imperfection estimation.
We propose to enhance the reliability of physical-layer authentication using MAMO techniques by the exploitation of as many of the physical-layer attributes as possible for improving the authentication reliability. Indeed, various channel-based and AFE-imperfection-based physical-layer characteristics may readily be combined for the environment-based characteristics and CSI, as well as some attributes like the RSSI and round-trip time (RRT). As for hardware-imperfection-based characteristics, I/Q amplitude mismatch and phase shift error, the CFO, the clock skew, and so on may be exploited.
The reliability of each physical-layer attribute has to be taken into consideration for multi-attribute-based authentication. The choice of using selected attributes for authentication depends on the specific application scenarios. For instance, the time-invariant AFE imperfections constitute beneficial choices in mobile communications; the channel-based characteristics are expected to work well in stationary indoor scenarios. To elaborate further, we may consider the combination of multiple channel-based and AFE-imperfection-based characteristics for improved authentication performance since it is extremely unlikely for an attacker to occasionally experience the same communication channel and its own nearly identical AFE imperfections as a legitimate transmitter. For example as studied in [12] , optimal weights can be set for each of the selected attributes according to their reliability; the authenticity decision can be made either separately or totally based on all the selected characteristics.
The proposed multi-observation technique constitutes another approach to enhancing the characteristic estimation accuracy. Receiver diversity is an effective means of combating wireless fading, which improves the channel capacity by increasing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Given the fact that the estimated characteristics predetermine the attainable authentication reliability, it is plausible that the proposed multi-observation technique improves the authentication reliability. In a cooperative communication system, the source usually relies on multiple relays and optimal relay selection, which facilitates collaborative authentication strategy. For instance, many relays may receive an authentication request from the same source due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Thus, the relays may rely on cooperative observations to jointly authenticate the transmitter for achieving improved authentication reliability.
seAmless IntegrAtIon wIth exIstIng networks And protocol usIng composIte securIty key
To achieve effective integration of physical-layer authentication and existing network and protocols, two key issues should be considered. First is the proper choice of the physical-layer characteristics that can be extracted for upper-layer security mechanisms. Due to the end-to-end nature of upper-layer authentication, the duration of such a procedure may be significant. Thus, only stable characteristics that are stationary during the authentication process can be exploited. Second, how to process the selected characteristics is another critical concern. The utilization of physical-layer characteristics in widely used symmetric/asymmetric key generation algorithms is an important area for further investigation.
In this subsection, we aim to address the problems in seamlessly integrating the physical-layer and existing upper-layer authentication schemes. We assume that device B needs to authenticate the claimed identity of device A, while devices A and B are in an end-to-end communication scenario, as shown in Fig. 2 . Device C, which can be a collaborative access point in practice, is a trusted third party of device B that shares the direct link with A.
The physical layer of our design, which is at the bottom of the protocol stack, plays the critical role of providing characteristics including IQI, CFO, and even antenna-specific characteristics to the upper layers.
The proposed authentication framework is summarized as follows. As a benefit of direct communication with device A, device C becomes capable of evaluating the physical-layer characteristics of A by analyzing its received signals. Therefore, the device-A-specific characteristics can be quantized and hashed at device C for generating specific digital numbers (i.e., PHY-key), which are shared with both devices A and B for further authentication-related processing. Specifically, these PHY-characteristic-related numbers of device A can then be used for generating an asymmetric key for authentication purposes in this article. The PHY-key related to device A can be utilized in the existing key generation algorithm at device A to generate an enhanced asymmetric key pair. The input from the physical layer, actually the PHY-key via device C, can be used as partial input to the private key selection in the existing key generator, thus leading to a physical-layer-dependent composite public and private key pair. On the other hand, the PHYkey can also be directly combined with the original public key from the existing key generator. This will lead to a composite public key capable of preventing unauthorized decryption and cryptanalysis. In this case, additional decryption steps will be required to remove the effect of PHY-key. After generating the composite security keys, the public key can be shared with B with the aid of the existing protocol, while the associated private key is only stored in device A without being shared with any other devices. Basically, device A uses its private key to encrypt plaintext and generate the corresponding ciphertext. Device B attempts to decrypt the ciphertext using the public key, while the authenticity of A is verified only if B is capable of decrypting the readable digest, since only A owns the private key. It is worth noting that PHY-key generation exploiting the hardware-imperfection-related attributes is typically more stable than those gleaned from the wireless channels as argued in [9] . The input from the physical layer expressed in terms of the total number of bits used in the CSK can be adjusted according to the robustness of the physical-layer attributes. In addition, mutual authentication may also be realized through utilization of the shared secret key between A and B with the aid of collaborative devices (e.g., device C for device A).
There are two main benefits of using the proposed PHY-key and composite security key. On one hand, the proposed method could be more efficient. Existing approaches directly using these physical-layer characteristics as an authentication tag will impose additional payload at each layer's data encapsulation, and cost additional bandwidth and power in delivering them to device B. Comparatively, using these characteristics as a securing key can eliminate this overhead. On the other hand, the robustness of the authentication process is enhanced. Similar to the two-factor authentication strategy in which the physical possession factor and virtual password factor are checked together as a double insurance, the PHY-key and CSK are also secured by the intrinsically unforgeable feature of physical-layer characteristics and the computational intractability of asymmetric encryptions.
AuthentIcAtIon hAndover sImplIfIcAtIon usIng physIcAl securIty context shArIng
In this subsection, we focus on simplifying the authentication procedure in the complex 5G HetNet. The prediction and sharing of physical-layer attributes as security context are the two key aspects of our solution. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , we assume a user is moving between cells.
Security Context Prediction:
The variation trend of attributes such as direction of arrival (DOA), RSS, RTT, and CSI can be used for physical security context, which can be further predicted based on their previous observations and play an important role in simplifying authentication handover. For example, with the predicted DOA, the authentication-oriented beams of a BS or an AP can accurately point to the antenna array of the intended user, which actively prevents an impersonation attacker from the highly directional communication link between the user and BS/ AP. Besides, these attributes can also be used to monitor and track the real-time moving direction and position of the user. The next cell that the user will enter can consequently be predicted. The authentication server thereby is able to prepare the authentication-related information (e.g., the PHY-key information) and send it to the serving AP of the next cell in advance. Once the user enters the new cell, the authentication and association request can be sent back immediately by the serving AP. It is noteworthy that the emerging software defined networking (SDN) can be utilized to efficiently manage the network-wide authentication information as proposed in [13] . Security Context Sharing: With increased network complexity and operating frequency, more physical characteristics and security context can be observed and shared for authentication purposes. The authentication handover may not happen in a completely new context, implying that much of the already known information of the stable and predictable characteristics can be reused. For example, the PHY-key has high potential to be used as a network-wide unique and unforgeable key because we involve physical-layer factors in key generation. In this case, some repetitive steps such as the frequently repeated pairwise key generation in the solely cryptographic authentication schemes can be reduced.
cAse study And performAnce evAluAtIon cAse study I: relAy AuthentIcAtIon usIng the multI-chArActerIstIc And dIversIty technIque
In the first case study, we consider the authentication of amplify-and-forward (AF) relay as a special case. AF relays, also known as ana- log repeaters, only work at the physical layer and thus cannot adopt most of the upper-layer authentication schemes. We here apply and evaluate only the physical-layer authentication reliability enhancement using the proposed MAMO technique.
The combination of channel-based RSSI and AFE-imperfection-based IQI may readily be considered as a benefit of their availability in most wireless receivers. The RSSI is representative of the level of the received radio signals and can be directly accessed at the physical layer [7, 14] . Regarding the IQI, we use the same model as in [4] , where the AF relay involves one receiving IQI component and one transmission
The proposed authentication procedure is evaluated using MATLAB simulations. We consider four legitimate AF relays and an illegitimate AF relay with a and q randomly chosen from -0.05~0.05 and -5°~5°, respectively. The RSSI readings of each AF relay are obtained from the experiments using Atheros WiFi devices [14] . We randomly choose one AF relay in each round of simulations, and estimate the corresponding IQI and RSSI of this relay. The generalized likelihood ratio test and hypothesis testing is applied first to determine the relay's authenticity based on the IQI and RSSI separately. Eventually, we combine the two attributes for the final authentication decision. Specifically, we claim to have a legitimate relay only when both the IQI-and RSSI-based tests claim the same legitimate relay nodes. Additionally, three antennas are assumed at the receiver to demonstrate the benefits of multi-observation-based authentication enhancement by using maximal ratio combining (MRC) of multiple received signals. The probability of correct authentication vs. false alarm rate is shown in Fig. 4 , where the probability of correct authentication is defined as the percentage of successful authentication trials in the total number of authentication tests. It becomes explicit that the probability of correct authentication is significantly improved by using multiple characteristics (i.e., RSSI and IQI) and MRC-based hypothesis testing. To be specific, the proposed MAMO technique provides on average a 9.28 and 50.48 percent higher correct authentication probability than conventional authentication techniques when only IQI is used in isolation with and without MRC, respectively. This is because the combined characteristics are more reliable and distinguishable than a single characteristic. Additionally, the accuracy of multi-characteristic estimating is further enhanced by combining multiple observations through MRC.
cAse study II: cross-lAyer AuthentIcAtIon usIng phy-key
In this case study, our proposed cross-layer authentication is evaluated in terms of correct authentication probability and delay reduction.
We first apply the proposed PHY-key into the existing one-way hash digital signature authentication scheme. The block diagram is shown in Fig. 5 . For simplicity, we also use IQI to generate the PHY-key in this case study. Without loss of generality, we consider a general transmitter rather than AF relay so that the IQI is modeled as [a t , q t ]. As shown in this figure, message-digest 5 (MD5) is used as the hash function to process the quantized IQI and generate the 128-bit hash value; the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) algorithm is used to process the outputs of the compositing procedure in order to generate the public and private keys as presented previously. The MRC relying on multiple antennas is also considered at the receiver to increase the IQI estimate-to-noise ratio.
Additionally, we also simulated the proposed authentication simplification in a handover sce- nario using the PHY-key. For description simplicity, we assume user U moves to a new cell covered by B from the cell covered by A, while A and B are served by server S. The identity of U has been authenticated by A, that is, A has the knowledge of U's identity as either a legitimate user or an impersonation attacker. We also assume an authorized devices list AUTH and an attackers list ATTK kept at A, B, and S as (AUTH, ATTK) A , (AUTH, ATTK) B , and (AUTH, ATTK) S , respectively. The lists contain the information of identity, PHY-key, and some predicted directions and positions of different users. Our handover procedure with the prediction and reuse of these lists is presented in Algorithm 1.
The simulation results on authentication probability vs. SNR and handover delay are shown in Fig. 6 . We can see that the probability of correct authentication of our cross-layer authentication increases with the SNR and can be further improved using MRC. It can also be observed that the correct authentication probability is higher than 97 percent even when the SNR is as low as 10 dB, which is representative of a relatively poor wireless communication scenario. For characterizing handover latency, we simulate our handover simplification method and compare it to the traditional handover scheme. The traditional handover scheme of [13] relying on [10] proposed by 3GPP is used in this investigation. In traditional handover, a highly authentication-induced processing delay is imposed by the handover-related request, response, and handshake procedures. In this figure, it can be seen that the delay of both methods increases when network utilization rate (NUR) becomes higher, where NUR is defined as the ratio of actual network traffic to the maximum traffic that the network can handle. We can observe that the handover delay for both methods stays low if NUR is below 60 percent. When the network load becomes high, our method shows its superiority in reducing the delay. Compared to the traditional method, the delay is reduced as we pre-share the (AUTH, s) of a user by relying Algorithm 1. Authentication handover using PHY-key.
1) Start of the authentication handover procedure.
2) A shares the (AUTH, ATTK)A about U to B directly or via S. B updates (AUTH, ATTK)B.
3) U sends B the association request with claimed identity and signature using the above-mentioned one-way hash method.
4) B first checks AUTHB. If U is in AUTHB, B uses the corresponding public-key to decrypt the received signature. If it can decrypt correctly, go to step 7); if it is incorrect, go to step 5). If U is not in AUTHB, go to step 5).
5) B generates PHY-key of U and checks (ATTK)B. If U is in (ATTK)B, go to step 7). If U is not in (AUTH, ATTK)B, B sends S the PHY-key of U, then go to step 6).
6) If S decides to grant U the access, go to 7); otherwise, go to 8).
7) B grants U the access in the response, and go to 9).
8) B rejects U in the response.
9) B shares the updated (AUTH, ATTK)B about U to the next possible cell based on the prediction.
10) End of authentication handover. Figure 6 . Probability of correct authentication using PHY-key and handover delay. on the prediction at step 2 and reuse the shared information at step 4. conclusIons This article focuses on the current challenges and future development of physical-layer authentication techniques. We identify three main challenges of physical-layer authentication development in terms of the relatively low authentication reliability, seamless integration with existing upper-layer authentication protocols, and the increased authentication complexity problem in 5G. We then propose three solutions to deal with these problems. Specifi cally, we propose MAMO techniques to enhance the reliability of physical-layer authentication. Also, we propose the cross-layer-aided architecture as well as PHYkey and composite security key generation to achieve seamless integration of physical-layer authentication and cryptography schemes. It is noteworthy that the brute-force search attack, which is the weakness of traditional cryptography, can be alleviated effectively by using the PHY-key. In addition, the upcoming 5G will have fundamental impact on current physical-layer authentication due to increased network complexity. New security approaches including the proposed physical-layer security context prediction and sharing have been studied in simplifying authentication handover in 5G.
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